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Peacekeeper Impartiality: Standards, Processes, and Operations 
 
Introduction 
It is a commonplace (at least among those concerned with peacekeeping) that peacekeeping 
operations (PKOs) have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War.  At the same time, 
UN peacekeeping is still ostensibly governed by the “holy trinity” of principles developed earlier 
in its history – consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force.  Understandings of impartiality, 
in particular, seem to have shifted in response to the increasing prominence of intrastate conflict, 
and to expectations that peacekeepers will stop human rights abuses and protect civilians as 
much as oversee an end to open conflict between parties.  Impartiality in this context cannot 
mean simply standing aloof from the conflict – but what then does it mean?  UN officials, 
analysts, and peacekeeepers in the field have given different answers.  I have my own – impartial 
peacekeepers should take the impact on the peace process as their primary standard for deciding 
when and how to take action; should create structured consultations with local parties (armed and 
otherwise) for deciding how to act when people disagree over what the peace process requires; 
and should be willing to put all elements of their power, including but not limited to the use of 
force, in the service of the peace process.   
My answer is frankly normative and revisionist, based in reflection on the best concept of 
impartiality.  I will discuss the varieties of answers given publicly, and in my own research to 
questions about what impartiality means, but I take that variety as evidence that there are many 
plausible interpretations of “impartiality,” and that some reflection on the space of possible 
meanings and the arguments that can be given for one interpretation or another can help us make 
good decisions about how we should understand the concept.  If nothing else, I hope that 
clarifying that space of possible meanings may help clarify things and help someone come up 
with a better answer than mine. 
Clarification is needed as peacekeepers undertake more complex and dangerous missions, and 
are called on to use more force.  Lack of consensus is present in the field, and this puts 
peacekeepers in literal danger if they are not resourced properly for the missions they will 
undertake and also in danger of failing in the eyes of the international public because 
expectations were not clear. 
The discussion here has implications far beyond the context of UN peacekeeping proper, though.  
First, UN practices cast a long shadow over peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions 
undertaken by other organizations, such as the African Union and NATO.  Second, national 
militaries are increasingly involved in irregular contests with intrastate forces, generating 
increased interest in “peace and stability operations,” even if these are not labeled 
“peacekeeping.”  The UN's peacekeeping principles were developed to respond to the need of 
maintaining legitimacy for operations designed to quell conflict in situations not that different 
from the ones international forces currently face in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.  While 
national militaries may not be constrained by a historical fidelity to impartiality, or by quite the 
same interests and norms that govern UN peacekeeping, any intervention force that that hopes to 
present itself as “on the side of the people” and not just a foreign conqueror can learn from the 




What is Peacekeeping? 
This question should be easier to answer than it is, and the answer I give here will inevitably be 
partial and provisional.  Not only is “peacekeeping” vaguely defined in most official sources and 
a concept that has shifted over time, missions labeled peacekeeping often differ greatly, and the 
concept borders on a number of related types of operations such as “peace enforcement,” 
“peacebuilding,” and “stability operations.”  Few analysts use precisely the same terminological 
distinctions, so I will draw from the UN's own doctrine. 
The UN capstone peacekeeping doctrine distinguishes between peacekeeping, peacemaking, 
peace building, and peace enforcement, and marks out peacekeeping as the technique used to 
“preserve the peace, however fragmented, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in 
implementing peace agreements.”  However, the doctrine itself acknowledges that peacekeeping 
and other tasks can overlap.1  While peacemaking-peacekeeping/enforcement-peacebuilding 
initially sounds like a linear temporal sequence, there is significant overlap, especially when 
security in one part of a theater of operations may be more stable than that in another.  In 
addition, many elements of peacebuilding, such as disarmament and security sector reform, are 
found in “multidimensional” missions like the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC) 
that are colloquially referred to as “peacekeeping.” 
In terms of impartiality since (as noted below) the concept is often discussed in the context of the 
use of force, the most interesting distinction is between peacekeeping and “peace enforcement.”  
Peacekeeping missions are permitted to use force “at the tactical level,” in self-defense or in 
defense of the mission, while force at the “strategic” level is reserved for peace enforcement 
missions.  The doctrine does not clearly define its distinction between tactical and strategic force 
but the key intended difference seems to be that peacekeepers are not to seek the military defeat 
of groups working against the peace process while peace enforcers may.2 
The line is not always entirely sharp, either theoretically or practically.  Missions that are 
ostensibly peacekeeping may use force in part to influence members of spoiler groups to 
participate in disarmament and demobilization processes – MONUC being a prime example.  
While this is not defeating the enemy in the sense of killing or capturing all combatants, it is not 
that far different from counterinsurgency best practices, and so stretches the boundary between 
tactical and strategic force.  Alternatively, we may just admit that missions like MONUC are 
hybrids between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, just as such complex missions straddle 
the line between peacebuilding and peacekeeping.  But then it is not clear how much guidance 
the doctrinal distinction gives members of the missions, especially since there are not separate 
military units for enforcement, the way that a mission will generally have a separate, e.g., 
Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Resettlement, and Repatriation (DDRRR) unit. 
                                                            
1 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), 18-19 (hereinafter, 
“DPKO Field Support”). 
2 DPKO Field Support, 34-35.  This is the doctrine's distinction.  “Peace enforcement” is sometimes also used to 
describe any use of force in defense of the mission, as opposed to self-defense, such as actions taken to defend 
humanitarians in Somalia in the early 1990s.  These actions would, I believe, fall under “tactical” uses of force in 
the Doctrine definition (though the campaign to capture or kill Aideed that grew out of the Somalia operations 
presumably would not).  I am indebted to Dr. Kólá Abímbólá for pressing me to clarify this point. 
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Despite these concerns, the distinction embodies an important concept for thinking about 
impartiality.  The intuitive grip that impartiality has as an element of peacekeeping is tied to the  
idea that peacekeepers do not have enemies, properly speaking.  If the overall goal is to stabilize 
a fragmented peace, even the most abusive and recalcitrant spoiler group is potentially part of 
that process, and peacekeepers should hence not use force in a way that takes sides against any 
group qua group.  Peacekeepers are not there to impose their view of a good society, but to help 
local forces and stakeholders build a society they can live within peacefully.  This then raises the 
core question of impartiality – if peacekeepers are there to bring all the various societal factions 
together in peace by protecting the process, how can they take actions that harm some factions 
and not others while maintaining this unbiased caretaker role? 
 
Conceptual Dimensions of Impartiality and Neutrality 
Peacekeeper neutrality/impartiality originated in the negotiations between Dag Hammarskjold 
and Gamal Nasser over the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956.  The compromise 
concept that emerged was, Dominick Donald argues, ambivalent.  On the one hand, 
Hammarskjold committed peacekeepers to not altering the distribution of power or prejudicing 
the interests of either party.  On the other, he maintained that the UN should be able to act on its 
understanding of the charter principles.  Practically, the tension tended to be resolved in favor of 
the more passive, do-not-influence-the-situation neutrality.  “Neutrality” and “impartiality” 
tended to be used interchangeably until post-Cold War operations began to put neutral 
peacekeepers in tight spots.3 
Neutrality, understood as not taking action against any side's interests, coheres nicely with an 
image of peacekeepers as there not to solve problems, but merely to keep a lid on violence while 
problems are solved through other means.  Neutrality may be appropriate when peacekeepers are 
serving primarily as an assurance mechanism – creating trust between parties by making sure 
that any violations of an agreement are publicized.  But the post-Cold War has seen increasing 
pressure for peacekeepers to take more robust action to resolve conflicts, including perhaps using 
force to enforce their mandate.  As a result, a notion of “impartiality” that favors principle over 
noninterference has gained favor. 
Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette made the distinction this way in June 2000: 
Impartiality is not the same as neutrality. Of course, United Nations forces must apply impartially 
the mandate given them by the Security Council. But that is not at all the same as being neutral 
between parties that obey that mandate and those that resist it, or between those who respect 
international humanitarian and human rights law, and those who grossly violate it.4  
The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (commonly known as the 
“Brahimi Report”) put the matter similarly: 
Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and 
to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not 
                                                            
3 Dominick Donald, “Neutral is Not Impartial: The Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace Operations Thinking,” 
Armed Forces and Society 23 (2003), 421-430. 
4 Louise Fréchette, “Deputy Secretary-General Describes ‘Changing Landscape’ of Peacekeeping in Ottawa 
Address,” United Nations Press Release DSG/SM/96, 8 June 2000, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000608.dsgsm96.doc.html (accessed October 27, 2006). 
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the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount 
to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious 
aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force 
but morally compelled to do so.5 
To these definitions I would add another, proposed by scholar/practitioners with experience in 
Kosovo.  As Michael Dziedzic and Len Hawley put it, a peace operation should take the position 
that “we support those who support the peace process and actively oppose those who obstruct 
it.”6  Though the authors are not primarily concerned with the neutrality/impartiality distinction, 
this clearly represents a kind of “even-handedness” in line with impartiality and opposed to a 
more passive neutrality. 
The UN's “capstone doctrine” for peacekeeping operations folds together several different  
considerations into its definition of impartiality: 
United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, 
but not neutral in the execution of their mandate. The need for even-handedness towards the 
parties should not become an excuse for inaction in the face of behavior that clearly works against 
the peace process. Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a 
peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of 
the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation upholds.7 
Discussions of impartiality and neutrality often assume that these are more or less unequivocal 
concepts, that are understood similarly by everyone in the debate, and that the main issue is 
justifying impartiality against those who would still require the UN to accept passive neutrality. 
But into all of these short definitions are packed a number of considerations. 
The fact that there are different possible understandings of impartiality is not just of theoretical 
interest.  Throughout 2009, a graduate student, Michael Kniss, and I conducted a number of 
semi-directed interviews with peacekeepers on ethics, in the US, Ghana, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda.  We spoke with individuals who had served in a variety 
of missions, from the early 1990s to the present.  Military participants ranged in rank (at the time 
of their service) from Major to Brigadier General (also, in one case, force commander of the 
mission); civilians ranged from low-level national staff to leadership-level headquarters staff, 
and included both civilian police and others.  Interviewees were given assurances of 
confidentiality, so full details of their positions cannot be made public, but notes on specific 
quotes used in this paper give more indication of their background.   
These discussions revealed diverse understandings of neutrality/impartiality.8  While interviews 
were conducted with an eye towards grounded hypothesis generation, and so statistically valid 
generalizations cannot be derived from them, they indicate that differences of perspective on 
impartiality do exist among peacekeepers, and can be found across a variety of missions, national 
origins, roles, and ranks.   
                                                            
5 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. 
A/55/305, S/2000/809, §50. 
6 Michael J. Dziedzic and Len Hawley, “Introduction,” in The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention 
and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, eds. Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 16. 
7 DPKO Field Support, 33 
8 Peacekeepers in the field also seemed to use both the terms “neutrality” and “impartiality,” without the usage 
necessarily corresponding to different views.   
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Some peacekeepers held that their role was to work within their often-limited formal mandate, 
even if this meant they could not take sides they would like to.  In a group interview with 
members of the Ghanian armed forces who had served with UN missions, they emphasized that 
their role had often been to observe and report, and they could do little more than ask the mission 
leadership to intervene at a political level if civilians were threatened.  As one put it, attacks on 
civilians were “affecting,” but there was little to be done – citing both the military weakness and 
limited mandate of most UN forces.9  Holding to the mandate even against personal conscience 
was seen by some as a way of demonstrating professionalism, avoiding conflict with factions 
that could undermine the mission, and protecting personnel under the peacekeeper's command 
from legal problems.10  On the other hand, another peacekeeper who focused on impartiality as 
sticking to the mandate, emphasized that this should be done even when it caused conflict with 
local factions.  This same interviewee acknowledged that sometimes a mandate or orders were 
“fragmented” or vague, but that in such cases recourse should be had to superior officers, not to 
one's own understanding of things.11   
In direct contrast, some took a very strong line that impartiality permitted peacekeepers to act 
according to their own conscience and understanding of fundamental legal and moral principles, 
even if this was outside the formal mandate and/or did not have superiors' approval.  One 
interviewee was vehement on the subject of the failures of the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR):   
“General Dallaire says he wants instructions. According to me, and according to our teachings, 
you are to act!  Don't tell me you are asking Kofi Annan and he hasn't replied.  It's stupid.  Act.  
The UN has sent you and what else do you need?  UN frowns on that. So act within what UN 
doesn't like!  … So, any excuse of inaction, or action saying that you do not know what to do, and 
blaming instructions is – to me, is punishable.  You should be punished for that.  We have 
subscribed to the international humanitarian law.  We have signed.  So how can your forces be in 
the field and you have forgotten that? Hasn't Ghana signed international, the Geneva Convention? 
Haven't you signed?  So what excuse do you have for not acting in the face of clear violations of 
human rights?  You have no excuse.  So you shoud act.  Act within those documents.12 
Or, as another interviewee pithily put it, “going by the book is good, but making exceptions is 
perfect.”13 
Others aligned their understanding more closely with the Brahimi report's aggressor/victim 
distinction, such as one member of the MONUC force who told us that impartiality meant that 
                                                            
9 Confidential group interview (A), with several Ghanian officers, Accra, Ghana, July 2009.  It should be noted 
that these officers were fairly high-ranking, and most had not served with UN missions in at least a decade (their 
primary UN service was with the UN Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL), so their views may represent an older 
understanding of impartiality/neutrality. 
10 Confidential interview (B), with a member of the RPF who had served with the African Union/United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), Kigali, Rwanda, December 2009. 
11 Confidential interview (C), with a member of the RPF who had served with the United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS), Kigali, Rwanda, December 2009. 
12 Confidential interview (D) with former member of Ghana Armed Forces who had served with the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the United Nations Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC), Accra, Ghana, July 2009. Note that while this interviewee did not serve in UNAMIR, Ghana 
was one of the nations that maintained troops in country after the main body of the force was withdrawn in the 
face of the genocide; the interviewee was part of the armed forces leadership at that time.  The interviewee raised 
the issue of Dallaire and UNAMIR of his own accord, not at the prompting of the interviewer. 




his first priority was to protect civilians, since “civilians are neutral.”14  Another member of the 
MONUC military component expressed a similar view, but seemed to take his task as preventing 
violence in general, “as long as nobody is being hurt, I am neutral.  If people are being hurt, I am 
not neutral,” adding that impartiality could not mean standing by while parties killed each other, 
so that this was not a reference only to preventing harm to civilians.15 
Understandings of impartiality sometimes seemed to bleed into consent, as when an interviewee 
included a need to support the local government forces, since “there can only be one army.”16  
At the same time, other interviewees mentioned national forces as a special problem for 
impartiality, since the mission was mandated to support national forces which themselves 
violated human rights (and impartiality, implicitly, demanded that all rights violations be treated 
equally).17 
Interestingly, while official statements on impartiality emphasize penalties and use of force, that 
was not the first connection for everyone in the field – including some military officers.  One 
military leader with whom we spoke explained his understanding of impartiality as first being 
about reporting the truth and being unwilling to hide any crimes, even if committed by the 
national army (that MONUC was supporting).  He discussed punishment only later, as a bit of an 
afterthought.18  Another spoke about impartiality primarily as a way of understanding the fact 
that his primary goal in the mission was to de-escalate conflict, making any use of force, even for 
good reason, a problem.19   
Members of mission political staff, perhaps less suprisingly, also tended to avoid 
operationalizing impartiality in terms of use of force, extending the concept in spirit to their 
work.  For instance, a MONUC DDRRR staff member described impartiality in terms of being 
as honest as possible with the individuals they were trying to demobilize.20  A member of the 
political staff of UNMIS based at UN headquarters described his approach as being modeled on 
the Red Cross', involving discussing human rights violations with parties privately but even-
handedly publicizing those that could not be addressed adequately.21 
Even though these concepts of impartiality are often compatible, they reveal diversity in what 
peacekeepers think is important, and their order of priorities.  Clarity about impartiality would at 
leats help peacekeepers understand the ways in which it might manifest differently in their 
different operational contexts.  In addition, having a “deep,” reflective understanding of 
impartiality will help peacekeepers make better decisions in cases where their obligations might 
not be entirely clear. 
Failure to make expectations about impartiality clear, especially as they relate to use of force, can 
cause direct operational problems for missions.  As one former UN military leader put it, “the 
                                                            
14 Confidential interview (F) with a MONUC military officer, Kibumba, DRC, November 2009. 
15 Confidential interview (G) with a MONUC military officer, Goma, DRC, November 2009. 
16 Interview G. 
17 Confidential interviews (H) with a MONUC international staff member, Goma, DRC, November 2009; and (I) 
with a member of the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) who had served as UNAMID military, Kigali, Rwanda, 
December 2009. 
18 Confidential interview (J) with a MONUC military officer, Goma, DRC, November 2009. 
19 Confidential interview (K) with a Rwandan officer who had served with AMIS, Kigali, Rwanda, December 
2009. 
20 Confidential interview (L) with a member of MONUC DDRRR staff, Goma, DRC, November 2009. 
21 Confidential interview (M) with a member of UNMIS political affairs staff, New York, USA, May 2009. 
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UN is very ambiguous in its resolutions for peacekeeping, the resolutions are never straight to 
the point... if you insert troops into a mission and the troops know that they are going to fight 
belligerents, then you go prepared for a firefight... but when you send troops where the situation 
is still not very clear, most of the time you find their responses are 50-50... If troops are clear in 
their minds as to what they are going to do there, then they get into that theater and do what they 
are supposed to do.”22 
Understandings of impartiality can vary along three axes: 
 To what standards of conduct should peacekeepers impartially appeal? 
 What process should be used to determine whether standards have been violated, and the 
appropriate response? 
 Which aspects of a peacekeeping mission's capacity should be subject to impartiality? 
In what follows, I will lay out what I take to be the major, plausible positions that one might take 
on each of these three questions.  I will then turn to my own suggestion about where best to 
“locate” impartiality along those axes. 
 
Standards 
Seven possible standards for impartiality are explicit or implicit in the definitions above. 
The Mandate (1): Frechette's statement, the Brahimi Report, the Doctrine, and many 
interviewees make reference to the mission mandate.  This may be the most straightforward 
understanding of an “impartial” standard.  Peacekeepers are given an explicit mission, and may 
pursue it, even when that harms some parties; they may not follow their consciences beyond the 
mandate.   
A Peace Agreement (2): While no definition I have cited explicitly makes the case for it, the 
relevant standard might be any peace treaty, cease-fire, or similar agreement in place for the 
conflict into which peacekeepers are introduced.23  Support for agreements is often incorporated 
into the mandate, which might account for its absence as a separate standard but we might also 
understand the overall goal of peacekeepers as there to support a peace agreement, even when 
that may go beyond the explicit mandate.  For instance, Romeo Dallaire, the Force Commander 
of UNAMIR, regarded supporting the Arusha Accords as authorizing him to create a weapons-
secure area in Kigali, including aggressively confiscating weapons.24  Arguably, this action 
would be permitted by the standards of supporting the peace agreement, but was not ultimately 
authorized in the mandate.  Still, if peacekeepers are supporting the peace agreement, they can 
plausbily say in defense of their impartiality, “all we are doing is what you agreed to.” 
Adhering to a peace agreement rather than the mandate, however, may raise concerns both about 
peacekeepers overstepping their authority – which comes from the UN, not the parties to the 
conflict – and conversely of subordinating UN decision-making too much to the local parties.  It 
                                                            
22 Confidential interview (N) with a Ghanaian officer who had served with UNIFIL, UNAMIR, and the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Accra, Ghana, July 2009. 
23 I will refer to any such document as a “peace agreement,” for brevity's sake. 
24 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002). 
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is one thing to mandate peacekeepers to support a peace agreement, thereby incorporating it into 
the mandate at the discretion of the Security Council, and another to make it a primary authority. 
International Law (3) generally or the UN Charter specifically (4): Frechette refers to the 
principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, and the Doctrine refers a bit more 
vaguely to international norms.  Alternatively, the Brahimi Report appeals to the principles of the 
UN Charter. 
These sorts of “constitutional” appeals to rules and principles which are to be taken as implicit in 
any peackeeeping mandate provide a basis for departing from the mandate in some cases of 
egregious abuse.  International law and the Charter represent existing, independent, “black letter” 
rules to which peacekeepers can appeal as an objective standard.  Peacekeepers can plausibly 
argue that they are all governed by those standards, regardless of particular mandates. 
Universal Morality (5): Appeals to “the principles of the Charter,” and the Ghanian officer's 
angry invocation of the Geneva Conventions, above, seem to be more about the moral principles 
of respect for civilians threatened by conflict involved than about technical legal details of the 
Conventions.  Appeals may be to a comprehensive moral theory, or something more limited, like 
an appeal to certain universal and basic human rights.25  Only the Brahimi Report language 
explicitly references the moral character of the parties, but a moralized interpretation of 
impartiality is often found in practitioners' views.   
The advantage of an unabashed appeal to morality is that it gives maximum reign to the 
prevention of abuses, as impartiality is definitionally connected to prevention of evils. The 
disadvantage is that appeals to morality, where they go beyond what is codified in law or the 
mandate, are likely to be the most controversial.  Without deciding the question of whether there 
are universal moral truths, we know that not everyone shares the same moral viewpoint.  If 
“impartiality” just means “do what you think is right,” offers no meaningful guidance.  It may be 
possible to define “moral” impartiality in meaningful terms, especially if the reference is to some 
sub-set of morality, like human rights, but it is not obvious how to do so. 
The Agressor/Victim Distinction (6): An interesting variation on the morality standard is the 
Brahimi Report's particular moral stance that peacekeepers should not be neutral between 
aggressors and victims (and should presumably take the side of victims).    
It is not clear whether this standard can be formulated in a way that is both distinctive and 
plausible.  If “aggressor” simply means “someone who is using force to achieve his or her 
goals,” then it is not  plausible that peacekeepers should always oppose “aggressors,” since some 
may have perfectly valid moral or even legal reasons for using force.  On the other hand, if we 
understand the distinction in moralized or legalized terms, where “aggressor” means something 
like “someone who is using illicit force to achieve his or her goals,” then we seem to be back 
with either a legal or moral standard. 
The Peace Process (7): Finally, we can move away from explicit mandates and peace 
                                                            
25 That is, someone who believes human rights are universally valid moral principles may not believe they exhaust 
morality.  For example, she may believe that everyone, everywhere, has a right to be protected from arbitrary 
killing.  She may also believe that everyone has a right to free health care.  Nonetheless, it would be plausible to 
believe that the special seriousness, or the “negative” nature of the right against arbitrary killing, makes it an 
appropriate standard for peacekeepers to uphold, while they would not be justified in enforcing free health care if 
the parties to a conflict did not agree to it. 
9 
 
agreements, but instead of escalating to “higher” rules like international law, take a more 
functional approach – making the peace process the standard rather than a peace agreement.  
This standard shows up in Dziedzic and Hawley, as well as the Doctrine.  It is also implicit in 
interviewees' concerns to de-escalate conflict and not become an enemy to any parties.  Peace 
agreements may be deeply imperfect, as they represent the outcome of a particular negotiation 
process at a particular time between particular parties, and will bear the marks of the existing 
balance of power and the strategic maneuvering of the parties to the agreement.  They may thus 
be deeply inequitable, provide cover for re-armament, freeze out certain parties who may then 
return as spoilers, or provide incentive for parties to become spoilers if their assessment of the 
sitaution changes.  Focusing on the peace process allows peacekeepers to be more flexible and 
strategic in the face of changing situations on the ground, at the cost of stripping them of much 
of the cover that pursuit of an explicit agreement provides.  
The standard of upholding the peace process may also shade into other standards, especially if 
peacekeepers take themselves to be pursuing “positive peace,” which includes some measure of 
good governance and respect for human rights, rather than merely “negative peace,” i.e., the 
absence of large-scale violence. 
There is some overlap between these standards, which is, I think, behind the fact that most 
definitions of impartiality in official documents and academic discussion appeal to several of 
them at once.  But even closely related standards may have different pros and cons, and so a 
serious discussion of impartiality should involve determining which one peacekeepers are 
supposed to appeal to when making decisions. 
 
Process 
Standards are impotent without some process for applying them, and decisions about process can 
often overwhelm decisions about standards in terms of practical import. 
The basic problem is that different people may – even if we assume they are judging in good 
faith – disagree about what the standards require in context. 
Some of the standards I have laid out in the previous sections have worse problems on this count 
than others.  We might all agree that peacekeepers ought to obey universal morality, but are 
unlikely to agree entirely on the content of morality.  Similar problems beset a focus on the peace 
process (since different parties may have different visions of the end-state) and moralized 
understandings of the aggressor/victim distinction. 
If we appeal to the mission mandate, a peace agreement, international law, or the UN charter, 
there is the advantage of being able to point to a document.  The basic problem of interpretation 
is that documents which set out rules and standards are rarely if ever absolutely clear in meaning, 
especially regarding how they are to be applied to complex situations.  
The wording may simply be vague or unclear.  Different rules of a system may conflict, with no 
clear procedure in the rules for resolving that conflict.26  Rules may need to be extended “in 
                                                            
26 This can arise even in a system with a hierarchy of rules.  For instance, in the US legal system, the Constitution 
“trumps” any other laws, but the meaning of the Constitution is often disputed and laws are to be interpreted, if 
possible, in a way that does not conflict with the Constitution.  There are often multiple ways of interpreting the 
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spirit” to cases not explicitly covered.  Rules may make sense in an unspoken/implicit social 
context that not everyone who is subject to the rules always understands in the same way.  Or, the 
authoritative document may use language that inherently invites judgment, such as “reasonable.”   
In peacekeeping, vagueness and judgment-prone language tend to be the most prominent issues.  
Where peacekeeping missions are expected to support peace treaties or ceasefire agreements, 
they may run into the problem that vagueness is a very common tool of diplomacy.  If there is no 
true “meeting of the minds” between parties to a conflict, one tactic is to draft an agreement that 
everyone knows can be interpreted differently.  Perhaps surprisingly, this often works – but it 
leaves peacekeepers who try to be “on the side of the agreement” with unclear guidance. 
The problem of judgment-prone language arises, for example, with respect to mandates that 
require missions to protect civilians when danger is “imminent” and protection is within the 
mission's “capacity.”  Is a militia that is known to be re-arming, and has attacked civilians in the 
past, an “imminent” danger?  What if it is re-arming personnel specifically in areas where 
tensions are likely to escalate, or its political arm is simultaneously spreading hateful 
propaganda?27  Specific intelligence about planned attacks may sometimes be available, but not 
always, and it is not always clear how credible the information is, or how credible it needs to be 
to support a judgment of “imminence.”  “Capacity” looks different if you are wondering what a 
unit could certainly do without taking any casualties, what it might be able to do if willing to 
suffer heavy casualties, or something in between.28  Yet trying to be more specific in mandate 
language might undermine the legitmate exercise of judgment by field commanders. 
These problems of interpretation are well-known in the context of legal systems, and the most 
common practical solution is to give some institution final interpretive authority.  This is a power 
to close the conversation, not to define the right answer.  In the U.S., I may think that the 
Supreme Court has made a mistake about the way the law should be interpreted – but our system 
is set up such that police, lower courts, and other agents of the law are expected to follow the 
Court's interpretation even when they think a mistake has been made. 
The larger point is that, even if we settle the question of by what standard peacekeepers should 
define their neutrality, the question of process will remain in the sense of asking who should 
make decisions about how standards are to be interpreted when interested parties disagree – the 
peacekeepers (even possibly including disputes within the mission), other internationals, parties 
to the conflict, local civilians, etc. 
There are three major options. 
First, peacekeepers could refrain from taking action when there is a dispute about what they 
should do.  Regardless of the standard used, this would amount to a neutral, rather than impartial, 
stance.  If parties are willing to act in bad faith, they could stop peacekeeper action merely by 
inventing grounds on which to disagree.  Even if we assume parties are acting in good faith, 
robust peacekeeper action would only be needed when parties were not already in agreement, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Constitution and the law in question so that they do not conflict, all of which are at least reasonable – so the 
Constitution's supremacy can introduce complexity into legal interpretation, rather than remove it. 
27 Highlighting the difficulty with terminology like “imminent,” note that there is a very contentious analogue in 
international relations, over what counts as (justified) “pre-emptive” warfare versus (unjustified) “preventative” 
warfare.  I am indebted to Nancy Gallagher for reminding me of this connection. 
28 Interview participants varied in the amount of risk they thought it was appropriate to take on either personally or 
on behalf of individuals under their command, in pursuit of peacekeeping objectives. 
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effectively rendering them neutral exactly when there is a conflict. 
Second, and on the other extreme, peacekeepers could themselves claim the mantle of 
authoritative interpreters.  Peacekeepers might be answerable to their own consciences, or to the 
Security Council, for their adherence to and interpretation of the relevant standards, but in the 
field they would both be bound by the standards  and the arbiters of what that binding meant.  
There might be institutional variations on this approach, especially regarding at what level in the 
mission decisions can be taken.  E.g., do all controversial cases go to the SRSG?   
I suspect most defenders of robust understandings of impartiality envision standards of 
impartiality as internalized rules that peacekeepers will will follow according to their own 
judgment.  Peacekeepers probably ought to try to explain how their actions are impartial if they 
are in question, but ultimately impartiality is to be wielded as a standard of conduct by the UN, 
to shape peacekeepers' own judgment, and perhaps against UN personnel by internal disciplinary 
units. 
A possible third stance is to institutionalize a process of negotiation/mediation in the case of 
disputes about the application of standards, whether between parties or between parties and the 
peacekeepers.  For instance, where parties were about to engage in armed conflict, peacekeepers 
might have the capacity and mandate to call those parties to the table to negotiate.  Or, if 
peacekeepers were  considering punitive or preventative action against some group, they might 
meet with the group to discuss what action was being contemplated and why before acting. 
There are some important details about this approach that would need to be worked out. 
First, should any negotiations be ad hoc or should there be a standing “contact group” of 
stakeholders?  Ad hoc arrangements have the advantage of being able to bring in any 
stakeholders to a particular problem that may arise, which may be difficult to predict in advance, 
and may be able to better accommodate social groups that lack formal organization (e.g., women, 
children).  On the other hand, standing arrangements allow for more advance notice, more ability 
to sense oncoming trouble, and more opportunities to build trust outside moments of crisis.  
Semi-formal contact groups including NGOs, peacekeepers, and local parties have shown some 
success, for instance during the first UNOSOM mission in Somalia.29 
Second, since negotiations are not instantaneous, this approach would need to be supplemented 
by one or both of the other approaches.  In short, peacekeepers need to know what to do while 
negotiations are underway.   
To prevent abuse of the negotiation process through delaying tactics, there would need to be 
some provision for peacekeepers making decisions on their own judgment.  For instance, where 
civilians are under clear and immediate threat from open violence, peacekeepers might act first 
with a process of “appeal” open later.  Or, failure to heed a call to negotiate with the mission 
could result in a “default judgment,” where peacekeepers then go on to act without regard to the 
no-show's interests. 
Even with these provisions, a negotiation option need not collapse into “peacekeepers judge.” 
Not all cases in which peacekeepers are called to act in ways that might be seen as partial to one 
side are ones in which bullets are flying.  In cases where prompt, but not immediate, action is 
                                                            
29 William J. Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State Building' in Somalia,” in 
William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1996), 324. 
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called for, there may well be time for peacekeepers to do nothing besides talking to the parties, as 
long as they are using this time to seriously negotiate.  In addition, different rules might apply to 
the enforcement of “procedural,” as opposed to “substantive” rules.  Parties might be on notice 
that failures to follow the consultation rules will result in non-negotiated sanctions. 
Finally, regardless of with whom the interpretive buck stops, it is important not to jump straight 
to enforcement, and to asssume that every delay or failure in negotiations must be the result of 
bad faith.  Armed groups may simply be bad at negotiating, and need training and/or material 
assistance (think of how much paper and computer time we academics consume “just talking”).  
A focus on negotiation as the core process of impartiality is as much about foregrounding the 
importance of providing support for the ability of stakeholders to negotiate as it is about pushing 
back the point of enforcement.  This is an area in which bad lessons may be learned from many 
Western legal systems, that tend to focus more on formal protections and process than on 
supporting the ability of everyone to effectively access and operate the system. 
 
Operational 
The Brahimi Report language explicitly ties the issue of impartiality to use of force, and it is  my 
experience that impartiality in the use of force dominates most academic discussions of the topic.  
But, of course, peacekeepers do plenty of things besides use force.  Why then focus on the 
military? 
The too-easy answer would be that only in coercive measures can peacekeepers demonstrate 
partiality.  Were this true, then humanitarians would never have concerned themselves with their 
own neutrality.  If you are feeding my enemy, you are helping him or her, and potentially hurting 
me by comparison.  Neutrality or impartiality in the use of non-military capacities is an 
important part of an overall non-partial stance. 
A second answer might be that only military force can be used as a strategy for 
punishing/influencing those who violate standards; avoiding impunity is a main concern of 
impartiality.  Consider the centrality of resource control to counterinsurgency doctrine.  
Counterinsurgents consider “winning hearts and minds” a key element of their strategy, and part 
of that strategy can be using resources differentially to demonstrate the benefits of working with 
the counterinsurgents.30  If counterinsurgents can induce civilians to turn against insurgents by 
providing the best services in areas under counterinsurgent control, peacekeepers could certainly 
undermine the power of factions by choosing to focus their non-military support on populations 
in areas controlled by more cooperative parties.  This is not to say that they should do this, but 
just that impartiality in the distribution of resources is a moral and/or tactical choice. 
Closest to the truth, I suspect, is the idea that neutrality in the use of non-military capacities is so 
obviously required as not to deserve further comment.  Military force is used to punish and deter 
spoiler groups directly, while the provision or withholding of aid puts pressure on those who 
                                                            
30 This is a central element of the standard “Clear-Hold-Build” counterinsurgency strategy.  In the “build” phase, 
non-military assets are used to improve the well-being of the population in counterinsurgent-held areas in part 
with the aim of “winning over passive or neutral people.”  See, e.g., Headquarters, Department of the Army, 




violate standards indirectly, largely via pressure on the civilian population that provides part of 
their powerbase.  Peacekeeping missions often curtail, e.g., provision of humanitarian aid to 
areas where they cannot protect the civilians who provide it, but deciding to refrain from 
providing aid where it could be provided because the faction in control of the area is being 
otherwise uncooperative with the mission or violating the relevant standards may seem clearly 
odious.  In terms of international humanitarian and human rights norms, though it is not a direct 
attack, it may seem to violate the spirit of the ban on targeting civilian populations for harm.   
I am not sure that the moral issue here is so clear.  Treating all civilians as fearful, huddled 
masses at worst coerced into service by armed elites not only oversimplifies the situation in 
nearly all cases, it perversely – and implausibly – robs civilians of all moral autonomy.  The 
power of armed elites generally represents a complex relationship with civilians in which both 
sides try to pursue their interests and goals, even if it is a lopsided bargain.31  Even if armed 
groups tend to hold power in part because of dysfunctional situations, it is not as if peacekeepers 
are always and everywhere welcomed as liberators, and it would be naïve to assume that all 
resistance to their presence was based on mistake or propaganda.  Civilians may have venal 
motives for supporting armed groups, or legitimate and understandable and even noble reasons 
for supporting even serious abusers, or a mixed muddle of morality, self-interest, fear, confusion, 
and anger.  In such situations, as Jeff McMahan has argued, civilians may be liable to certain 
sorts of harm; though, in his view, generally not armed attack, but leaving open various non-
neutral ways of arranging other peacekeeping operations.32  
I have advanced some views on the proper moral approach to using coercion against civilians in 
situations of irregular warfare elsewhere.33  Here, let me just leave it open that peacekeepers 
might choose to apply a non-neutral impartiality standard in their use of other operational 
capacities, such as humanitarian aid, infrastructure projects (especially including quick-impact 
projects often undertaken as part of a “winning hearts and minds” strategy by military elements), 
DDRRR, election support, governance assistance, education/training, even good offices for 
mediation of disputes. 
One reason that such measures might seem morally objectionable, even if we grant that civilians 
may be morally involved in the actions of non-civilian actors, is that we commonly make 
exceptions to the right against physical harm that we do not for other rights.34  We are 
accustomed to thinking of the right against threats to life as a right against arbitrary threats to 
life.   Many people who defend a “right to life” do not object to a lawfully executed death 
penalty, and absolute pacifists are a small fraction even of those who oppose judicial deprivation 
of life.  In Western legal systems, and more importantly in general social morality that underpins 
                                                            
31 For a masterful analysis of the interaction between insurgents and civilians that determines patterns of insurgent 
violence, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), esp. chs. 
7, 10-11. 
32 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (New York: Oxford UP, 2009), 218-220. 
33 Daniel H. Levine, “Care and Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Military Ethics (forthcoming) 
34 I must note the limits of my own cultural competence here.  I am primarily speaking of the way such rights are 
treated within the dominant Western human rights discourse that seems to underly most of the thinking about the 
ethics of such things like peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention – at least where I live.  My anecdotal 
sense, from speaking with a number of Africans and South Asians about these things, is that their views do not 
tend to be drastically different on the points I am discussing.  That said, if necessary, read these comments and 
any invocation of “we” as an exploration of the Western approach influential in international decision-making, 
rather than with a serious claim to true universality. 
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these systems, the right to life shares a certain exception-laden structure with rights to property 
and liberty. 
But fewer exceptions are made to other rights.  Many people who would happily endorse the 
imprisonment of a murderer, or even his (or her) execution, would be appalled if he were 
knowingly allowed to die of disease because available medical care was withheld, if he were 
allowed to live in filth while awaiting execution, or if his right not to be raped were allowed to be 
violated. 
Intuitions that oppose the “tactical” use of things like humanitarian aid may be grounded in the 
idea that while the right not  to be attacked in armed conflict can be forfeited or waived, the right 
to be given food and medical care one needs to survive is something one possesses merely in 
virtue of being human and so cannot be lost. 
 
Choosing a Position 
I have laid out a space of possible understandings of impartiality along three dimensions: 
standards, procedures, and operations.  I hope that, in itself, this is a useful exercise.  But, it 
would smack of intellectual cowardice for me not to say anything about how I think we should 
understand impartiality. 
 
Standard: Peace Process 
Though I have identified seven possible standards, they fall  into three categories: written rules, 
unwritten rules, and functional standards.  Each has things to be said for and against. 
Written rules include mission mandates, provisions of peace agreements/ceasefires, international 
laws, and UN charter rules.  These standards have two advantages.  First, they are often the 
product of an explicit act of granting consent, by at least many parties to the conflict, giving them 
an initial advantage in terms of legitimacy.  Second, while they do not settle questions of 
application on their own, they certainly help by giving all parties an explicit text as a starting 
point.   
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any such rules will reflect either the legitimate interests 
of all stakeholders or that enforcing them will advance the cause of peace.   
Unwritten rules include deontological versions of universal morality (including non-legal 
understandings of human rights), moralized versions of the aggressor/victim distinction, and 
possibly UN Charter “principles” if these are understood as distinct from explicit provisions of 
the Charter.  They share the inflexibility of written rules, and lack the advantage of being explicit 
– being unwritten, parties may disagree about what the rules are, and hence they are less 
effective at constraining and shaping disputes.   
They make up for this with a stronger claim to being right.  Genuine moral rules claim higher 
authority than other considerations and include all legitimate stakeholder interests by definition.  
Enforcing them may not promote peace, but defenders could argue that this would only prevent 
unjust peace from being achieved. 
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Functional standards include only focus on the peace process, of the standards I listed above.   
Functional standards have the advantage and disadvantage of maximal flexibility in pursuit of 
their goal, since the goal is the only standard to be respected.   The advantage is that the goal – 
peace, in this case – is more likely to be reached.  The disadvantage is that, similar to unwritten 
rules standards, functional standards provide less guidance for disputes than written rules.   
In addition, functional standards encode values, and so are subject to many of the same vices and 
virtues as unwritten moral rules.  To take a position on what “peace” means, whether mere 
absense of violence or some more substantitive “positive peace” - is to take a moral position on 
what ought to be the outcome of the conflict and intervention.  If this moral position is correct, it 
has a strong claim on the ability to supersede negotiated agreements and formal mandates.  On 
the other hand, the correctness of any moral stance is likely to be hotly contested, and may itself 
be a source of conflict that makes the PKO seem like an interested party, and undermines any 
appearance of impartiality. 
Of these three approaches, understanding impartiality as adhering to a functional standard would 
be best.  Peacekeepers are charged with laying the foundations for peace, first and foremost, and 
their impartiality should reflect that overriding goal. 
 A Focus on the Peace Process is Superior to a Focus on Written Rules 
There is one simple reason I say this: written rules are the outcomes of negotiations between 
parties who may not have the legitimate interests of all stakeholders in the conflict at heart.  In 
the case of “high level” rules like international laws, this is because they are most often crafted 
without any specific reference to the conflict at hand – they couldn't be.   
In the case of “ground level” rules like peace agreements and ceasefires, this is because not all 
stakeholders are always brought to the negotiating table, and new stakeholders may emerge in 
the process of trying to implement the agreement.  In particular, since a peace agreement needs to 
give armed factions incentives to end their conflict, groups that are not able to use force and/or 
are not organized as groups, are less likely to see their interests protected.  These stakeholders 
who are left out may include women, ethnocultural minorities, and locally legitimate social 
structures not organized for violence (e.g., the non-violent LDK in the Balkans or the traditional 
Somali clan structures that had been usurped by “warlords.”).  The fact that they are not included 
in the agreement does not mean that they do not have morally legitimate interests, and the 
advantages of clarity provided by written agreements should be overridden by these moral 
concerns.  Furthermore, their exclusion undermines another potential advantage of explicit 
agreements, in that there was no moment of consent for excluded groups. 
Aside from legitimacy, including as many stakeholders as possible in the peace process seems to 
yield practical benefits.  For example, one report credits female participants in Sierra Leone's 
Lomé peace process with ensuring that language protecting women annd girls in the peace 
agreement.  They also argue that a public shaming of Sankoh (the rebel leader, appointed a 
minister in the new government) by a group of elderly religious women was a major catalyst for 
mass protests that ultimately brought about Sankoh's arrest and the collapse of the rebel 
movement, which had played a continuing spoiler role in the peace process.35 
                                                            
35 Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson, From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone, Hunt 




An example from the opposite side, Elmi and Barise argue that the Somali peace process is 
threatened by the fact that merchants and members of many Islamic courts and local security 
forces were excluded from the formal peace negotiations, and hence need to be brought into the 
process.36 
Mandates deserve special mention; they are crafted to deal with a particular conflict, and telling 
peacekeepers that they are subject to a higher principle of impartiality that can conflict with the 
explicit mandate may seem dangerous. 
While the mandate is crafted to fit the conflict, it still suffers from the problem that its creation 
does not involve many relevant stakeholders – the issue is even more extreme with most 
mandates than with peace agreements, which are at least not written in New York.  Mandates 
probably are written in good faith and with an attempt to protect the interests of everyone 
involved in the conflict, but this is no substitute for a process that can be directly accessed by 
people involved in the conflict. 
The issue of superseding mandates is more serious, but is actually a feature of any standard 
besides the mandate.  If any general principle of peacekeeping could not contradict any mandate, 
then they would serve no purpose, and peacekeepers might as well be told that there were no 
principles beyond the mandate they are given.37 
The concern can be mitigated but not eliminated entirely.   
First, as a general principle, impartiality is not only applicable to peacekeepers in the field.  It 
should also be a guiding principle for those writing mandates. 
Second, there is a difference between going beyond the explicit mandate and contradicting the 
mandate; peacekeepers are more likely to be called to do the former.  General principles like 
impartiality are most important where a mandate or orders are unclear in application, and 
peacekeepers need guidance in using their judgment. 
Third, some potential conflict may occur, but this is no more damning than, e.g., the fact that 
soldiers in the US military swear their primary oath to uphold the Constitution of the US.  In 
some cases, soldiers may be given orders that they believe violate their Constitutional 
obligations.  The first option in cases of apparent conflict is to assume that the conflict is only 
apparent or seek clarification, but some cases of genuine conflict may remain.  The fact that 
educating peacekeepers with general ethical standards of the profession may occasionally cause 
them to question directives that do not live up to those standards cannot be a fatal objection.  
Mandates can claim no privileged status in virtue of being explicit directives to peacekeepers, 
and adherence to the mandate suffers from the fault all written standards have, that they are 
crafted by a subset of interested parties in a particular power relationship. 
 A Focus on the Peace Process is Superior to a Focus on Unwritten Rules 
If the big problem with written rules is that their mortal origins undermine their claims to 
legitimacy, unwritten rules seem to fix that.  The advantage is not that they are unwritten, but the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
df, 21-22. 
36 Afyare Abdi Elmi and Abdullahi Barise, “The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles, and Peace-building 
Strategies,” African Security Review 15:1 (March 2006), p. 46. 
37 This is, in fact, the purpose that “impartiality is adherence to the mandate” seems to serve – it is presented a 
corrective against the thought that peacekeepers are required to refrain from forceful action because of 
impartiality/neutrality concerns, even when the mandate authorizes them to act. 
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nature of the suggested rules.  Universal morality, the basic principles of international law, and 
the principles of the UN Charter are all unwritten because they purport to represent higher 
standards that transcend the petty details of human agreements.  The UN Charter is a document, 
but the principles of the charter are the highest aspirations of humankind coming together in the 
name of peace and human rights. 
Unfortunately, what these rules gain in legitimacy, they lose in the concrete ability to solve 
disputes and confusion.  We should not forget that the impartiality concept is intended to give 
peacekeepers guidance for decision-making.  The content of highly abstract ideals and principles 
is deeply contested and difficult to determine.  By contrast, a focus on the peace process is 
relatively concrete, even if not as explicit as written rules.   
As noted above, there is also a severe lack of consensus about the content of most of the 
proposed unwritten-rule standards, which undermines the entire point of impartiality.  Partiality 
is not likely to be the result of blind bias on the part of peacekeepers.  It is more likely to 
represent their belief that one side of a conflict is in the right (or less in the wrong) and should be 
supported.  Defining impartiality inn terms of standards which peacekeepers are likely to 
interpret very differently from other parties thus renders the concept likely to reinforce behavior 
seen as partial, rather than limiting it. 
There is also a more practical reason to favor an understanding of impartiality that focuses on the 
peace process, rather than holds peacekeepers to moral or quasi-legal principle.  The most 
common unwritten standard to which peacekeepers are held is protection of human rights, but 
saying this is not a strategy for ensuring that people have their rights protected.  Of course 
peacekeepers themselves should refrain from abusing human rights; that idea does not need to be 
backed by a concept of impartiality. 
Beyond that, some understandings of impartiality seem to imply that the concept should obligate 
peacekeepers to react immediately to any violation of human rights.  We should not expect 
peacekeepers to take such a reactive stance.  All manner of evils flourish during periods of armed 
conflict – human rights violations, poverty, misery, ill health, lack of political freedom, even 
economic inefficiency.  Peace provides a much better platform, in almost all cases, from which to 
pursue other goods.  One reason to intervene in cases of human rights abuses is that they can fuel 
further conflict, so a focus on peace will not always recommend different action than a human-
rights-focused impartiality.  But peacekeepers should bear in mind that their role is to help usher 
in a stable situation in which human rights can be effectively protected on a regular basis. 
 
Process: Formalized Mediation 
Interpretive authority should not rest entirely with the mission – some form of institutionalized 
mediation process with stakeholders best expresses the moral core of impartiality. 
First, peacekeepers are not set against simplistically evil spoilers.  Parties may have legitimate or 
understandable disputes even with well-intentioned PKOs, that ought to be taken into account.  
Spoiler groups often have constituencies who regard them as at least partly legitimate authorities 
and protectors of the population's interests. As one UN official put it to me, speaking of janjawid 
(government-allied militias, accused of genocide) leaders in Darfur: 
Well, you will need some of these so-called guys who have committed atrocities to get peace here. 
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You need them. So, if you start demonizing them, you'll fail. And not only fail then, you'll get the 
population against you, because they have built their bases, they have built their constituencies. 
You can't just say, because you announce it that he's a criminal, that the people on the ground 
accept him as a criminal. No. You've got to understand the dynamics on the ground. Some of them 
are not doing that because they like fighting. They were chiefs, they were elders in their 
community. So, it was their responsibility to protect, just like we are saying, "responsibility to 
protect," they also had a responsibility to protect their tribe. So, any fighting they did, any 
atrocities you think they committed, was done in the name of that. You need to understand these 
dynamics.38 
PKOs best express their position not as parties to the conflict, but as facilitators of an end to that 
conflict, by assuming that any standards-violation may in fact reflect an underlying reasonable 
dissatisfaction.  By providing a venue in which parties can explain their actions, they stand a 
better chance of transforming the bigger drivers of conflict.  If conflict drivers are not effectively 
addressed any use of force or coercion by the PKO will at best be able to change the calculation 
of incentives.  And, given the relative military weakness of most PKOs, change in incentives is 
likely to be temporally and geographically local.  While it may seem ludicrous to look for the 
legitimate motivation behind some undisciplined soldier looting and raping in the aftermath of 
conflict, we should keep in mind that this is often a bit of an exaggerated stereotype, and that the 
bigger issue for a PKO is that soldier's leadership, who are likely encouraging/allowing such 
violations to occur for reasons that can be addressed. 
Conversely, negotiations/discussions also provide a venue in which  the PKO can explain its 
actions.  Just because the PKO sees its actions – especially aggressive ones – as impartial and 
justified does not mean that everyone else sees them that way, and armed factions may worry 
that a PKO has “declared war” on them.  In Somalia, for instance, the contact group set up with 
representatives from various “warlord” factions was instrumental in calming the situation after 
an early attack on Aideed's forces.39  The need for a PKO to communicate clearly with factions 
was also emphasized by some interviewees, such as a Rwandan officer in AMIS, who discussed 
the need to approach rebel forces and explain why the mission was living only alongside 
government police.40 
Second, we should be wary of what picture of the PKOs mission we are building into the 
impartiality standard.  While criticism of PKOs often focuses on failure to stop acute human 
rights violations, the primary goal of the mission should be to facilitate peace between the 
formerly warring factions.  Reserving the right to punish transgressors in line with the mission's 
own understanding of things is not necessarily the best way to do this – whether we are talking 
about transgressions against peace agreements or more fundamental human rights.  It is widely 
acknowledged and understood that the use of coercive measures should only be one part of a 
PKOs approach, and should not be done for its own sake or without regard for political, 
humanitarian, etc. consequences.  Embedding any use of ostensibly imprtial coercion in a 
negotiation process with stakeholders helps practically embody that perspective. 
                                                            
38 Confidential interview (O) with a UN political officer, who had served in the AMIS military component, New 
York, USA, May 2009. 
39 Durch, 324. 




Impartiality Should Encompass All Operational Dimensions 
The focus in many discussions of impartiality is on use of force, because that is the typical image 
of how serious rights violations are to be prevented and punished.  This is perhaps the case for 
imminent and violent rights violations.  But this is a relatively narrow focus, and ignores the 
ways in which other capacities of a mission can be used to shape an environment that 
discourages abuses. 
Keep in mind that peacekeepers are unlikely to have enough resources to provide for all of a 
population's needs.  How should they make decisions regarding where to put those resources to 
use? 
We surely do not want to lock peacekeepers into a purely reactive “first come, first served” 
approach, especially when we move away from classic humanitarian aid like food and toward 
resources like support for governance.  The most plasuible competitor seems to be something 
like “greatest need.”   
But if we are trying to maximize the good done, the point about ending conflict helping to end 
many associated evils holds.  Purely humanitarian agencies typically do not have the capacities 
to try to end the conflict as a whole – but peacekeeping missions do (or should).  Using 
humanitarian capacities in a fashion impartially designed to help the peace process along, at least 
so long as this is a matter of scarce resource allocation, not of simply withholding resources that 
are available, should be seen as preferable to aiding the neediest now if it will perpetuate a 
situation in which they are needy. 
Much more needs to be said beyond this basic moral orientation.  In particular, peacekeepers 
need to be both careful and honest.  Careful, in that they do not jump to quickly to a kind of 
naïve utilitarianism.  The impact of using non-military resources as a tool to shape the conflict is 
just as difficult to predict as the use of force, and just as subject to the law of unintended 
consequences.  Honest, in that peacekeepers should not pretend to themselves or others that the 
goals of promoting peace, long-term development, and ameliorating the immediate situation of 
particular people will always coincide nicely.  If peacekeepers focus on manipulating the 
situation to advance the peace process, they much recognize that such a focus takes resources 
away from other goals. 
 
The Whole Picture 
Combining these three choices, I recommend an understanding of impartiality as: 
 The mission will deploy all of its resources, including but not limited to its capacity to 
use force  
 toward the aim of promoting the peace process. 
 Where parties in the area of operations disagree about what “peace” should entail, or 
whether some particular use of mission resources promotes it, the usual process for 
resolving the issue should be through a standing contact group/mediation process 
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involving all major stakeholders. 
The overall image is that the mission's impartiality consists in it not appearing as a pure outside 
force nor as standing apart from disputes, but rather as part of an outside-supported process of 
creating resources primarily directed by the stakeholders to achieving peace.  Its impartiality 
does not come from being an incorruptible guardian of a strict standard (let alone a passive 
observer, on the old neutrality standard) but by actively striving to ensure that resources for 
peace are directed in a way that gives all parties a say. 
The main benefit I would claim for this understanding of impartiality is legitimacy.  Standards 
like impartiality are ultimately about justifying the actions of peacekeepers, who whatever their 
motives are outside interveners who make life-and-death decisions about how to distribute 
resources and when to use lethal force. 
This understanding of impartiality, while admittedly revisionist, also coheres with other elements 
of how peacekeepers with whom we have spoken understand their role.  In general, references to 
a need to “de-escalate,” “tone down,” or similarly reduce the intensity of conflict were common 
in interviews.  One high-ranking MONUC military leader told us that it was “tricky” to maintain 
peace as soldiers, since their role as peacekeepers was to exercise their diplomatic and 
communicative skills, and this was in tension with their identity as soldiers.  He was especially 
emphatic – even after defining MONUC as having a “peace enforcement clause” - that 
innovative approaches, besides resort to force, were critical to the mission.41 
In a couple cases, specific references to negotiation even when it might seem most difficult were 
noted.  A Rwandan officer told us that while force was needed, it was primarily to maintain 
credibility.  Once the peacekeepers had established that they could defend themselves if 
provoked, the primary task was to negotiate with armed groups – even, in one case, when his 
group had been ambushed by rebels apparently intent on taking their vehicles – rather than defeat 
them.42 
One civilian member of MONUC was of the opinion that the mission could not succeed unless 
some way were found to negotiate and cooperate with members of the FDLR, a militia 
notoriously led by Rwandans who had participated in the 1994 genocide, and which as a group 
has been accused of perpetrating many of the most extreme human rights abuses in the DRC.  
“For myself, I think that the... limitation that we aren't allowed to speak or collaborate with 
people who are suspected of FDLR collaboration should weigh less heavy than the overall peace 
process and the overall well-being of the population... I think on theoretical grounds, on 
principled grounds, it's totally correct.  Seeing the situation on the ground, and seeing the whole 
history of the situation, I think we as MONUC, and myself, or MONUC-Goma, can be, or maybe 
we should be a bit more flexible.  And I know in fact that some officials are being flexible, 
despite the official policy.”43 
Finally, a concept of impartiality that highlights the role of peacekeepers as there to shepherd a 
local process of negotiation and conflict transformation, rather than to enforce standards and 
defeat violators, coheres with some peacekeepers' own views of the good they achieve.  One 
former member of UNAMIR – part of the small Ghanaian contingent that remained behind under 
                                                            
41 Interview J. 
42 Confidential interview (P) with a Rwandan former member of AMIS, Washington DC, October 2009. 
43 Confidential interview (Q) with a member of MONUC's political staff, Goma, DRC, November 2009. 
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Dallaire's command after most troops had been pulled out by the UN – told us that, “a lot of 
people said that mission was a failure, but that little force, the presence of that small force, 
helped to alleviate some of the sufferings of the people, because that was the force that started 
the negotiations between the two sides.”44   
I suppose one could accuse such sentiments as “defining success down,” since in an ideal world 
one might hope that the UNAMIR force would have been willing and able to prevent the 
genocide.  But, we should keep in mind that in the actual world peacekeeping missions are 
unlikely to be able to defeat insurgencies or abusive government forces on their own, and also 
that it is easy to have a rosy picture of how a full-scale military engagement against the Rwandan 
government would have gone.  The actual RPF advance was far from bloodless, and international 
intervention would likely have had its own costs.  These costs would almost surely have been 
preferable to genocide, but far from negligible, and how to balance the costs of an intervention 
with the firepower and mandate to make war upon “spoilers” with the abuses those spoilers 
committ may not be as obvious when abuses do not rise to the level of genocide. 
One major loose end has to do with the problem I raised earlier about “backup process.”  What is 
the PKO to do if there is no time for discussions, or if discussions stall or are fruitless? 
There need not be a single answer to this question.  First, the general rationale of this approach 
would justify potentially harsher dealings with groups that violated the PKO's understanding of 
the standards, or especially the contact group's understandings, but who refuse to participate in 
discussions.  While every effort should be made to reach out to them, and to address whatever 
reasons they have for non-participation rather than simply punishing them for it, it would be 
reasonable to treat those who voluntarily exclude themselves as forfeiting some right to have 
their interests respected in many cases. 
Second, where serious evils are about to happen and peacekeepers can intervene, it does not cut 
against this approach in all cases to say that they should.  So, if (e.g.) police are about to fire on 
unarmed demonstrators, peacekeepers can interpose themselves.  The overriding moral goal is 
still peace and human flourishing that is easier in peacetime.  But in such cases, peacekeeper 
action should be as narrowly focused on stopping the current problem as possible – not on 
capturing, pursuing, or punishing the parties at hand.  The bulk of rights abuses in peacekeeping 
areas of operations are not sudden rights abuses that happen out of nowhere and for no reason – 
and the underlying reasons should be addressed through a negotiated process, rather than by 
peacekeeper fiat. 
 
Is This Impartiality or Neutrality? 
One aspect of my proposed understanding of impartiality is that it does not empower 
peacekeepers to do what is right in all circumstances.  Being only one voice in a negotiated 
process for responding to possible violations of the peace process means that sometimes 
peacekeepers' view of that process may differ from local views, and peacekeepers will not punish 
or prevent things with which they disagree.  This is not as radical a neutrality as the old standard 
of not taking action against any parties, but it is also not as radically empowering a stance as 
                                                            
44 Interview N. 
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some of the understandings of impartiality with which I opened the paper. 
This is, I think, a feature rather than a bug.  We do not need to be moral relativists to embrace a 
certain humility about moral judgments.  Peacekeepers may be acting entirely in good faith, but 
if there is a reasonably fair mediation process in place, it should give us pause if their views 
about what is right for the stakeholders differ from the outcome of that process – it is entirely 
plausible that some complexity of the situation may have been missed.  And, in the long run, 
giving as much control as possible to stakeholders over what “peace” should look like, while 
providing the resources to back up a vision created in the relatively benign context of a well-
managed negotiation rather than war, is the most plausible way to promote a lasting peace. 
 
